Should hedge funds be regulated? by Goldschmid, Harvey et al.
T he rapid growth of the hedge fund industry has attracted increasing attention from govern-ment regulators. In the United States, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) voted in October 2004 to require many hedge funds to officially register with the
Commission beginning in 2006. Actions such as this have led to a widening debate over whether
(or to what extent) government should play a role in the development of the hedge fund industry.
To address this issue, The Program on Alternative Investments at Columbia Business School’s
Center on Japanese Economy and Business sponsored a symposium entitled “Should Hedge
Funds Be Regulated?” which was held at New York’s University Club in November 2004. U.S. SEC
Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, currently on leave from Columbia Law School, delivered the
keynote speech, arguing in favor of the Commission’s October decision. 
Following Commissioner Goldschmid’s address, Program Director Mark Mason moderated a
panel of leading experts from the business, government, and academic communities who debated
the pros and cons of government involvement in the industry. These panelists included Franklin
Edwards, Arthur F. Burns Professor of Free and Competitive Enterprise at Columbia Business
School; John Gaine, President of the Managed Funds Association, a leading hedge fund industry
group; Sudhir Krishnamurthi, Managing Director of Rock Creek Capital, a Washington,
D.C.–based fund of hedge funds; and Nobuyuki Kinoshita, Director at the Financial Services
Agency of Japan.
This report covers the keynote address by Commissioner Goldschmid, together with the remarks
of the expert panelists and selected exchanges with the audience. Columbia Business School
Dean Glenn Hubbard and Center on Japanese Economy and Business Director Hugh Patrick
delivered opening remarks, which are also reproduced in this report.
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MARK MASON
Director, Program on Alternative
Investments, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business, Columbia
Business School 
Good afternoon. I am delighted to
welcome you to this afternoon’s sym-
posium, “Should Hedge Funds Be
Regulated?” It is perhaps an indica-
tion of the importance of today’s
theme that such a large audience,
representing the business, govern-
ment, and academic communities,
has chosen to attend. We hope you
find the symposium balanced and
informative.
It is an honor to introduce Glenn
Hubbard, the distinguished Dean of
Columbia Business School, who will
now offer the opening remarks. Glenn?
GLENN HUBBARD
Dean, Columbia Business School 
Thank you, Mark. This past July, in a
split vote, the SEC adopted a rule for
hedge fund registration. This decision
was controversial; I think the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury weren’t uni-
formly supportive. I will put myself
in that camp as well.
There are some very tough economic
questions that no doubt will come up
in the discussion today. There are
always, of course, a few fraudsters in
any industry and in any part of finan-
cial services. When one thinks about
any sort of regulatory regime, the
comparison of benefits and costs in
addressing fraudsters is a key issue. 
What about retailization and the
involvement of the “little guy”
through pensions? An interesting
question, although pension invest-
ments and commitments in hedge
funds are just a little more than one
percent of the assets of pension
funds—far smaller, for example, than
pension fund commitments in private
equity. I guess one could then ask,
might that be the next stop?
Another question from the land of
cost-benefit analysis is whether the




use of resources to regulate hedge
funds is meritorious, as it might drain
resources from other areas that are
more related to the protection of ordi-
nary investors. Would the regulatory
regime that we’re now contemplating
have prevented some of the bigger
problems we’ve seen in the past in
this industry? For example, Long Term
Capital Management? The answer is
maybe “yes,” but more likely “no.”
We have a great keynote speaker
today, a great panel, and a lot of
great questions. So at this point I
want to turn the program over to my
colleague Hugh Patrick to introduce
our keynote speaker.
HUGH PATRICK
R. D. Calkins Professor Emeritus of
International Business
Director, Center on Japanese Economy
and Business
Columbia Business School 
Thanks very much, Glenn. It is both
my privilege and my pleasure to
introduce Harvey Goldschmid, com-
missioner at the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission. He has had 
a distinguished career as Dwight
Professor, a chaired professorship 
at Columbia University’s Law School.
Over his career, Professor Goldschmid
has been an active leader in analysis
and policymaking in a range of
important areas where government
regulation and the private market
interact and intersect: trade, antitrust,
and, of course, securities regulation. 
In my view, Professor Goldschmid
epitomizes the idealized role of what
a law professor should be. Over his
career he’s taught and done research
that has focused directly on major
issues of public policy. Most impor-
tantly, he’s put his body where his
mouth is. He’s gone down to
Washington and served earlier with
the SEC. I think academics have the
responsibility to represent the public
interest, seeking the public good
rather than the vested interests of
companies, government bureaucrats,
politicians, or anybody else who tries
to lobby the public policy process.
Professor Goldschmid performs that
independent, objective role very well.
Of course, determining what policies
best serve the public interest is by no
means easy. When should the gov-
ernment leave people alone and let
markets operate, and when should it
impose rules and regulations? What,
specifically, should they be? Once
regulations have been imposed and
we’re in the new world, what does
that really mean? How are they
implemented and how far do they
go? Those are the sorts of issues that
we want to address today. We’re 
very fortunate to have Commissioner
Goldschmid with us, and, if you
don’t know where he stands on these
issues, you will find out right now.
Thank you.
HARVEY GOLDSCHMID
Commissioner, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission
It’s always a great pleasure to be
back at a Columbia Business School
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operate, and when should it impose rules and regulations?
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event. The comments I make today
are my own and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Commission,
my fellow commissioners or the
Commission staff. That’s our normal
disclaimer. The short form of that is
nobody in Washington has to take
seriously anything I say today.
This is an important topic. As the panel
will indicate afterward, good minds can
differ. Glenn Hubbard has already sug-
gested that. But, as for the question,
“Should hedge funds be regulated?” my
easy answer to that is “yes,” at least in
the way the SEC wants to do it. On
October 26, I was one of three votes,
in a three-to-two Commission vote, in
favor of registration.
Before I explain my reasons for vot-
ing in favor of registration, let me 
put the hedge fund issues in a larger
context—the context of securities reg-
ulation reform in response to the cor-
porate and mutual fund scandals of
the 1990s and early 2000s. I suspect 
it would be common ground in this
room to suggest that the scandals
have been the most serious in the
United States since the Great
Depression. It should come as no
surprise to anyone that this has been
the busiest period in the history of
the SEC, with the possible exception
of the period around 1934, when the
Commission was created and new
programs and procedures had to be
put into effect. 
In terms of causation, my bottom line
is that the scandals occurred due to 
a systemic failure. The checks and
balances that we thought would be
provided by independent directors,
independent auditors, securities ana-
lysts, commercial and investment
bankers, lawyers, and compliance
personnel too often failed. As most of
you know, during the past two years
serious SEC enforcement efforts and
rule-makings have come in each of
these areas. The rule-makings and
the enforcement efforts have involved
some combination of increased and
timelier disclosure (certainly true for
public corporations and mutual
funds) and enhanced responsibilities
for key actors—for directors, officers,
accountants, lawyers, and others in
the financial community.
In addition, in institutional terms, 
the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and new
“reporting up” rules for lawyers are
making a large difference. The
PCAOB and the rules for lawyers
have changed both the substantive
standards and, more dramatically, 
the way we conduct oversight of
accountants and lawyers working
with public companies. We’ve moved
from a system of weak state regula-
tion and self-regulation to a federal
presence. Now, to varying degrees,
there is federal oversight of both 
professions.
For unregistered hedge fund advisers
who have been saying “Why us?” 
I say, you’re not alone. Everybody
involved with public corporations,
mutual funds, and Wall Street has
been looked at, and there’s been a
tightening across the board. 
To illustrate the Commission’s regula-
tory approach and to begin to answer
a criticism posed by a very fine paper
written by Professor Frank Edwards,
let me briefly explain the causes of,
and the SEC responses to, the mutual
fund scandals. To quote Frank
Edwards, “Fraudulent activity
occurred in the highly regulated
mutual fund industry where the SEC
examiners were already inspecting
funds and the SEC failed to turn up
evidence of the frauds.” Now, Frank
was kind enough not to cite State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer run-
ning ahead of us (on a very good tip)
in September 2003, but implicitly—
and these are my words, not his—he
was suggesting: “Why would SEC
inspections or examinations of hedge
funds be valuable in the context of
the SEC’s failure to find out what was
happening at mutual funds?” 
Step back with me and think about
the mutual fund scandals. We have
witnessed a grievous breach of trust
in the mutual fund area. The serious-
ness of the scandals can only partially
be measured by the money involved.
We have roughly quantified share-
holder losses at $2 billion in the
investigations and enforcement
actions we’ve taken so far; with
what’s in the pipelines, that number
may jump to $3–5 billion. That’s a
lot, but if you think of Enron, securi-
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ties holders lost $60 plus billion; if
you think of WorldCom, $120 plus
billion was lost. So the mutual fund
scandals were not so much about the
money as about the breach of trust 
in a business in which trust was the
core of what was being sold to more
than 90 million Americans. The level
of what went on in terms of late trad-
ing and in-and-out fast trading (abu-
sive market timing) was a special
problem no matter how you look at
it. What did we do about it?
First, and this is the usual SEC
approach in terms of scandals, the
Commission moved quickly on a com-
bination of enforcement cases and
rule-makings. In terms of rule-mak-
ings, the idea was to eliminate the
temptations and abuses that went with
market timing, late trading, and other
practices that we’ve now prohibited,
such as directed brokerage. Then, we
worked on enhancing disclosure and
mutual fund governance reform. 
Getting back to Frank Edward’s
point, let me use late trading as a
way of explaining what SEC inspec-
tions can and cannot do. Going into
a mutual fund, our inspectors would
not have been able to see late trad-
ing. Indeed, that information came 
to Eliot Spitzer through a tip. The
papers and documents at the banks,
brokers, and funds were fraudulent.
They showed the trading had taken
place before 4:00 p.m. No inspector
could have known that was untrue
had he or she looked at the mutual
fund itself. 
But if we had been going into the
hedge funds—there were 30 or 40 or
maybe more that were involved in
egregious ways—it would have been
easy for our inspectors to have seen
what was wrong. Using any kind of
risk analysis, and looking at how
money was being made, it is perfect-
ly clear to me that had we been
inspecting hedge funds, we would
have picked up the scandals earlier. 
Now, you should all understand that
late trading is simply looting. Events
have occurred after the markets
closed at 4:00 p.m., and you know
that, as a result, dramatic portfolio
changes will occur. In good news sit-
uations, late trading allowed hedge
funds (and others) to buy at cheap
prices. Eliot Spitzer correctly said it
was like betting on a horse race after
the race has been run. It took no
skill, no intelligence, and no financial
acumen of any type. It involved cor-
rupt payments to those who facilitat-
ed the late trading. That’s the basic
background in terms of what went
wrong in mutual funds, and, obvious-
ly, the hedge fund linkage is real. 
Let me begin talking specifically
about hedge funds by confronting 
the myth that a rush to judgment has
taken place. The new hedge fund
adviser rule and amendments were
approved by the Commission on
October 26. This action was the 
culmination of a long and serious
process. We weighed carefully the
concerns of the hedge fund commu-
nity and others worried about coun-
terproductive effects. We looked at
possible less restrictive alternatives,
but they were inadequate compared
to what I believe is a modest, prag-
matic, balanced regulatory approach.
In trying to think through these issues,
I asked myself, “Why alter what has
been the SEC’s largely hands-off
approach with respect to hedge
funds?” We’ve always prosecuted
fraud, but the question is: “Why inter-
vene now? What compelling public
policy concerns would get you there?” 
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First, we know too little about this
dramatically growing industry, and
what we do know has alarm bells
ringing, at least for me. Eight or ten
years ago, hedge funds held roughly
$100 billion in assets. In September
2003, an SEC staff report put the 
figure at $600 billion. When the
Commission acted on its proposed
rule-makings in July 2004, hedge
fund assets were estimated to be
$850 billion. Most estimates suggest
that there will be a trillion dollars 
in hedge funds by the end of 2004.
Moreover, all of these figures are
from industry sources and are unreli-
able. Some Wall Street estimates have
suggested a $1.5 trillion figure. We
need accurate information about the
aggregate size of hedge funds, about
how leveraged they may be, about
their trading patterns, etc. More—and
more accurate—information will both
protect investors and significantly
enhance the Commission’s ability to
protect our securities markets.
Second, there has been a recent
increase in cases involving hedge
fund fraud, both on hedge fund
investors (e.g., involving misappropri-
ation, false valuation, and fraudulent
promotion) and on others. Canary
and too many other unregistered
hedge fund advisers had a corrupting
influence (e.g., through “sticky assets”
and side payments) on mutual funds
that resulted in the late trading and
abusive timing scandals.
Finally, there is the issue of retailiza-
tion that Glenn Hubbard mentioned
earlier. Hedge funds are no longer
dealing just with the funds of the
wealthy. More and more, the general
public’s savings and charitable funds
are being put at risk. Hedge funds
are involved with large and sharply
increasing amounts from private and
public pension funds, funds of hedge
funds, and endowments and other
charitable institutions. My cab driver
in New York yesterday owned the
medallion to the cab. He told me that
he was about to begin to put money
into hedge funds. Under the rules of
the game now, plumbers, cab owners,
lawyers, and pharmacists all are quali-
fied to invest. I think Frank Edwards
is going to try to make a case that
that’s good, but these are risky ven-
tures and do not make sense for most
of those kinds of investors.
Now, in terms of cost-benefit analy-
sis, what are the advantages of the
kind of regulation of investment
advisers to hedge funds being con-
templated? One—accurate informa-
tion about the funds themselves will
not be available to investors (e.g., on
aggregate size, leverage, etc.). Two—
disclosure about the hedge fund
advisers will take place. Such adviser
information is now generally avail-
able to investors who do “due dili-
gence,” but now the information will
be publicly available. Such disclosure
will deter fraudsters from entering the
business and save investors separate,
costly, duplicative investigations and
other “due diligence” expenses.
Why would you want to have “due
diligence” investigations repeated
time and time again by different
investors as opposed to making the
information available publicly and all
in one place? Three—there will be
record-keeping requirements, but,
again, not at all onerous. Typical
accounting records are already nor-
mally kept, and there will be some
special requirements from the SEC.
But again, these will be very moder-
ate. Four—there will be protection
for when the hedge funds keep cus-
tody of client assets. Again, it will be
a safeguard that’s very useful but not
very costly.
Five—there will be compliance safe-
guards. A chief compliance officer
and internal compliance programs
will be needed. The hedge funds
covered will have a minimum of $25
million of assets to be in the federal
system. Who would want to invest in
a fund without a serious compliance
program? The same thing is true of
6 Center on Japanese Economy and Business Program on Alternative Investments
We know too little about 
this dramatically growing
industry, and what we do
know has alarm bells ringing.
—Harvey Goldschmid
ethical codes that are going to be
required.
Finally, there’s a good deal of 
discussion (that goes back to Frank
Edwards’ earlier point) about whether
SEC examinations and inspections of
hedge funds would make a differ-
ence. Clearly, I think they would
have made a big difference in expos-
ing the mutual fund scandals, and 
I think that’s a consensus view of 
the staff at the Commission. But the
examination program is even more
important than that. Roughly 40 per-
cent of investment advisers to funds
are registered with the Commission
today. Five of the eight cases brought
against registered advisers in the past
three years have come by way of SEC
inspections. 
More importantly, inspections, and
the threat of inspections, bring about
accountability and deterrence. I’m not
suggesting that inspections are going
to catch all fraudsters or that all will
be deterred. But, whether one analo-
gizes to tax audits or police patrols,
one knows that the risk of getting
caught and punished has a significant
deterrent effect, particularly on white-
collar wrongdoers. The threat of SEC
inspections, which are getting more
sophisticated, is a real disincentive to
wrongdoing.
Now, of course, the issue of the
SEC’s ability to carry out these exami-
nations and inspections is fairly
raised. Again, the figures are soft, and
the data are imperfect, so we don’t
know exactly how many additional
inspections will be required. The esti-
mate is for roughly a 12 percent
increase in inspections. I’m satisfied 
that the Commission staff will be able
to do the job effectively. We now
have serious compliance programs
for investment advisers in general
(these went into effect in October
2004). Also, we are growing more
efficient, more sophisticated, and 
our risk-based assessment programs
and tools will allow the SEC staff 
to increase its inspection capacity. 
In the unlikely event that the staff is
stretched too thin, the Commission
has the ability, if necessary, to raise
the current $25 million figure and
reduce the number of inspections. In
terms of planning time, the increase
in inspections does not take effect
until February 2006.
The Commission’s regulatory approach
to hedge funds is meant to be nonin-
trusive. There will be no interference
with their investment strategies, with
their operation, with their creativity
or liquidity, or with their flexibility. 
In general, the costs of this regulatory
scheme will not be very high. The
world is full of thousands of invest-
ment advisers who are now regulated,
and that regulation has not been bur-
densome in terms of either time or
dollars. Again, roughly 40 percent of
the hedge fund industry is already
regulated through registered invest-
ment advisers.
Hedge fund advisers will be able 
to continue their current investment 
programs without SEC interference.
Derivative trading, leverage, short
selling—all of these will continue
without any interference from the
SEC. Similarly, there are no portfolio
disclosure provisions. 
A hedge fund’s ability to keep things
secret (e.g., trading strategies and
portfolio composition) will continue.
In terms of what we’re doing, hedge
funds will be able to continue to
charge their clients performance, 
just as they do now. 
There is a modification, a tightening,
in terms of who can invest, but the
Commission has grandfathered all
current investors. After February
2006, you’ll need $1.5 million of 
net worth rather than $1 million, 
and getting into hedge funds with
just $200,000 or $300,000 of income
won’t be possible, except for those
who have been grandfathered. I think
that’s all for the best. These are not
investments that ought to be open to
everybody; there is simply too much
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risk in the kind of trading that’s being
done.
Let me close on two notes. One, a
rational regulatory system responds
to warning signals and to substantial
and growing risk. This is the context
in which the Commission moved
ahead on October 26. Given the sub-
stantial and growing risk for the mil-
lions of investors who are involved 
in pension funds, in funds of funds,
and in other investment vehicles with
hedge funds holdings, the SEC simply
could no longer turn a blind eye.
Finally, on an optimistic note, please
understand that over the past two
years serious SEC rule-makings and
enforcement efforts have occurred in
area after area. Officers and directors,
accountants, lawyers, and others in
the financial community, now includ-
ing hedge fund advisers, have been
dealt with sensibly and with balance.
In general, the scandals of the 1990s
and early 2000s have forced us to
face serious systemic imperfections,
but they’ve also made it possible for
us to bring about healing and reform.
My view is that what’s been done
will allow the United States to main-




Question: I’m very much appreciative
of the comments you made regarding
the fact that the business model and
functioning of hedge funds will not
be interrupted by these regulations,
and I would tend to agree for most
of the larger, better-capitalized institu-
tions. The question is, “What tax does
this impose on the smaller shops,
and does that lead to an anticompeti-
tive pressure where the incumbent
only gets stronger and can raise fees?”
Goldschmid: Antitrust is one of my
academic fields, and so entry barriers
are very important in terms of my
thinking about what we’re doing and
why we’re doing it. That’s why I
stressed how little we are asking of
investment advisers. You start with an
investment adviser with $25 million
or more in terms of the assets being
managed; there’s very little in what
the SEC is asking that’s costly. Indeed,
thousands of investment advisers are
already out there and living quite
easily with what we have imposed. 
My view is there’s no significant entry
barrier here at all. Small funds will
continue to develop. The large guys
will be run even more effectively,
and there will be more security for
everybody concerned. 
Question: Do you think there should
be a balance struck as we do with
most other sophisticated products in
the product market—automobiles,
firearms, etc.—where the user stan-
dard may not just be simply a net
worth test but rather a sophistication
test, or a hiring of sufficiently sophis-
ticated monitors and intermediaries,
as opposed to just simply handcuff-
ing or putting a lot of pressure on
the managers?
Goldschmid: Well, they have very 
little handcuffing here, as I see it, 
and the idea is to let the market
decide. However, there will be a
slight increase, at least for those not
grandfathered, in the kind of wealth
you’ll have to bring to the table. 
Question: Would it be correct to say that,
in its efforts to register hedge funds, the
SEC has primarily been emphasizing
investor protection rather than systemic
risk concerns? Do you share the Fed’s
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sense that as long as you’re regulating
the counterparties to hedge funds, you
don’t really have to worry so much
about the systemic concerns?
Goldschmid: I share Chairman
Greenspan’s high regard for the eco-
nomic functions performed by hedge
funds. Certainly, investor protection is
a principal SEC focus. But I am also
concerned about market integrity in a
broader sense. Consider the fact that
hedge funds generally are trading
more than others and that we had
the problem of hedge fund corrup-
tion of mutual funds. It’s important to
know what we’re dealing with; when
they get more than $1 trillion, and
maybe higher, one ought to under-
stand the impact of hedge funds in
an economy like ours. We ought to
know what we’re talking about in




President, Managed Funds Association
Thank you, Mark. The Managed Funds
Association has been very much
engaged in a number of issues relat-
ing to the hedge fund industry and,
in particular, over the last several
years with the SEC in their dialogue
concerning what to do about hedge
funds. I feel a little bit like the Red
Sox playing up at Yankee Stadium
here, but, hopefully, the outcome 
will be as good. 
Of course, Commissioner Goldschmid
is a very worthy advocate. When
Mark Mason was kind enough to
invite me weeks ago, I said this is
really going to be fun, because we
can roll up our sleeves and we’ll get
right down to the merits of a rule,
what the policy implications are,
what the justifications are, etc., etc.
Well, I have it on good authority that
Commissioner Goldschmid went to
Chairman Donaldson in mid-October
and said, “Look, I’ve got to defend
your rule in front of 150 of the
brightest people in the country,
including Frank Edwards and Dean
Hubbard; we’ve got to adopt it
before I go up there so I don’t get
murdered.” So Chairman Donaldson
scheduled the vote on the rule for
October 26, and it was adopted in 
a three-to-two vote, which has the
effect of tempering my remarks con-
siderably, because I will work coop-
eratively, fully, diligently, friendly,
and professionally as I always have
with my friends at the SEC.
If you go to the MFA Web site, you
will see a plethora of information
outlining our case against regulation.
To get into this at this point would
be akin to saying that Al Gore is really
president of the United States. The
rule has been adopted. The rule is
going into effect, and we’re looking
forward in a very positive way. 
I am tremendously reassured by
Commissioner Goldschmid’s reitera-
tion of his statements that, as long 
as he is around, this registration
requirement will be nonintrusive, 
and noninterfering with the liquidity,
the flexibility, or the innovation of
the hedge fund market world, because
this is really underlying a lot of our
concern. 
Unfortunately, as Commissioner
Goldschmid pointed out, we had
Enron—public shareholders taking a
bath; WorldCom—public shareholders
taking a bath; mutual funds—94 mil-
lion Americans taking a bath. There
was a grievous breach of trust by the
mutual fund managers to their investors.
I agree with all of that. Why is that
different from hedge funds? Hedge
funds are an institutional market-
place. Their investors are high net-
worth individuals and institutions. 
As one lawyer in Washington says,
“Every widow in Chevy Chase is an
accredited investor.” Well, that’s right,
because if your home is worth $1
million, that makes you an accredited
investor. We’ve asked the SEC to
double or triple this criterion and
raise the $200,000 annual salary 
minimum. This will draw a clearer,
crisper, more appropriate line, in our
view, between the “mom and pop”
retail investor and the institutional
marketplace. That we do support; 
the SEC apparently does not.
You’re going to hear from Frank
Edwards later. I think many of the
arguments he has made in his paper
are very similar to the kinds of argu-
ments we have been making over the
last couple of years at the SEC. This
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hedge fund initiative was kicked off
by former Chairman Harvey Pitt in
May 2002 in front of the Investment
Company Institute, which is the
mutual fund lobbying arm. He said
there are three areas of concern: one
was retailization; one was the inci-
dence of fraud; and the other was the
side-by-side management of a mutual
fund and a hedge fund with the obvi-
ous conflict of interest potential for
allocation to the fund that would give
you a better return.
Upon examination, fraud didn’t appear
to amount to much on the retail side. 
It doesn’t exist. We want to raise the
standards for investing in hedge funds,
and we think there’s plenty of authority
to handle that at the SEC.
We had all these Enrons and the
environment was bad, so in a sense 
I think the baby is going out with 
the bath water. The Commissioner’s
remarks, as well as those of Chairman
Donaldson and others who were 
proponents of this rule, are reassur-
ing, saying that it really stops here 
at water’s edge. If you speak to 
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan or
Treasury Secretary John Snow, other
financial regulators, and the biggest
players on Wall Street, they would
have a fit if you started telling them
that the hedge funds they invest with
on a regular basis were going to have
their investment activities chilled.
This is the lifeblood of the economy
for these large investors; they live
and die for it. 
While I’m up here, I’d also like to
bring up, Mr. Commissioner, my seat
assignment at the Hedge Fund Round-
table in May 2003. I don’t know if
you ever remember flying the old 
727 jets, but if you get the rear seat,
it’s like row 38—the seat doesn’t go
back. Well, they sort of gave me the
middle seat of that row between
Commissioner Goldschmid and Doug
Scheidt—the chief counsel of the
Division of Investment Management. 
I was in a position where I couldn’t
take a note, I couldn’t turn a page.
So I had to pretend to be going to
the bathroom so I could check my 
e-mail and see what was going on.
Apparently, the case for this rule was
made during those periods when I
was out of the room, because I don’t
recall any other time during which
the case for this new rule was made. 
Anyway, on a positive note, and I am
sincere about this and my remarks
about Commissioner Goldschmid earlier,
I have always been in touch with Paul
Roye, who is head of the Division of
Investment Management. What we need
to insure is education. There is little
understood about this industry across
the board. Journalists are coming up to
speed very quickly. Some of the poli-
cymakers are coming up very quickly.
We need to sit down with the SEC. I
spoke to Paul Roye this morning. We’ve
been approached by the SEC’s Risk
Assessment Task Force, and I am hope-
ful that we will be able to engage in a
meaningful dialogue, which will result
in efficient risk-based audits that will
be nonintrusive, as the Commissioner
hopes. They will produce the informa-
tion the SEC feels it needs and, when
you graduate with your M.B.A., there
will be a hedge fund industry for you
to come into and succeed in.
On that note, I’ll finish. Thanks for
your time.
Mason: Thank you, Jack. Our next
speaker is Sudhir Krishnamurthi, who
is a managing director of the Rock
Creek Group. As you may know, Rock
Creek is a large and reputable fund of
hedge funds based in Washington, D.C. 
SUDHIR KRISHNAMURTHI
Managing Director, Rock Creek Group
I think many of the arguments and
points as to why we need regulation
have already been made, and I would
like to just go over them, very quickly,
just to set the stage so that we can
have a more meaningful debate.
The size of the business has grown.
It’s a trillion-dollar business, which
obviously has implications for the rest
of the securities industry. Even though
the hedge fund industry itself has
qualified investors and all that, the
point is it is a big elephant sitting in
the den. So the rest of the securities
industry is going to be affected. That’s
the reason why you want to make
sure that you know what the elephant
looks like, very much along the lines
the Commissioner was just noting.
The case is that there has been fraud.
Now, people have said the level of
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fraud was minimal, but is that because
they haven’t searched hard and deep
enough, or is it that we have searched
hard and deep and that’s all the fraud
we could find? That point is still a lit-
tle unclear. If one can take the same
argument in the insurance industry
before Mr. Spitzer got into the bro-
kerage business, for example, there
was no fraud, but now, after the
investigations, the story is likely 
different. The question is, have we
investigated all that we need to?
It is true that hedge funds are for insti-
tutional clients, and I think that’s obvi-
ously clear, but there are more and
more exposures to other clients. Now,
is $1.5 million or $1 million a lot of
money? Not really. There are about
8.2 million households in the U.S. 
that have more than $1 million in 
net worth without including a spouse
and private residence. So that’s a 
large number, and that’s a number for
whom some protection needs to be
given, even if the size of the invest-
ment is kept reasonably high.
Those are some of the key points.
Now, I believe that the kind of frauds
that will be perpetrated by somebody
in the hedge fund industry would be
no different from what some have
committed when given the same
opportunities in the mutual fund
industry or in any financial business.
Human nature is what it is. So if
there’s fraud in one place, there’s no
reason to believe that there won’t be
fraud somewhere else. So the two
points that I think the Commissioner
was making—about compliance and
deterrence—were exactly dead on.
The final point is that there are two
issues. One is the whole issue of
compliance: how expensive is it, and
is it really going to be too costly to
the industry? In fact, we did this
study, and we obviously talked to 
a large number of hedge funds in 
the industry (we did this before the
October 26 ruling, and we’ve been
doing it since). Most hedge funds will
make some fuss about it, but when
you really push them, they say the
cost of compliance is really, in the
larger scheme of things, very small.
So I would say it is not the cost but
the magnitude of the cost in relation-
ship to the overall size of the busi-
ness, which is very small.
At the end of the day it is just good
business practice. Many of the things
that are required under registration 
or regulation are things that a good
business would oversee anyway,
things like conflict of interest, voting
proxies, whatever. Those are all
things that a good financial business
would do in any case. Thank you.
Mason: Thanks very much, Sudhir.
We will now hear from Frank Edwards,
the Arthur F. Burns Professor of 
Free and Competitive Enterprise at
Columbia Business School. Frank is
an unusually well-qualified scholar to
speak on today’s topic, given his for-
mal training in law as well as finance. 
FRANKLIN EDWARDS
Arthur F. Burns Professor of Free and
Competitive Enterprise, Columbia
Business School
I appreciate Commissioner Gold-
schmid’s willingness to be here today,
because he probably had some idea
that he might be running into a free-
market bias against regulation. And
indeed that is going to be my position
today—that the SEC’s regulatory ini-
tiative on hedge funds is not a good
idea. Requiring hedge fund advisers
to register with the SEC is unlikely to
accomplish much, and it does not
pass the required cost-benefit test. 
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But let me back up a bit and ask
why we haven’t regulated hedge
funds before now. Why do hedge
funds enjoy exemptions from the
1933 Securities Act, the 1940
Investment Company Act (ICA), and
the 1940 Investment Advisors Act
(IAA)? Hedge funds can take advan-
tage of the “accredited investor”
exemption from the 1933 Act (or the
private placement exemption). To be
an “accredited” investor, you need
either $1 million of net worth or an
annual income of $200,000. Why do
we have this exemption? Why have
we exempted investment vehicles
with only accredited investors?
Because we have a philosophy that 
it should not be necessary to expend
taxpayer funds to protect wealthy
and sophisticated investors, such as
“accredited” investors are assumed to
be. These investors should have to
take care of themselves. 
Hedge funds also are exempt from
regulation under the 1940 ICA (mutual
funds) for a similar reason: they typi-
cally have only “qualified” investors.
These are investors with at least $5
million of investments. Under our
standard approach to regulating
financial markets and financial instru-
ments, investment vehicles with only
“qualified” investors are exempt from
regulation because these investors are
assumed to be sophisticated enough
to take care of themselves, and if
they aren’t, they can at least afford 
to take the hit. Why should far less
wealthy taxpayers have to support
government regulation aimed at pro-
tecting wealthy investors? There should
be better uses for taxpayer funds. 
Of course, if we were concerned that
some “accredited” investors in hedge
funds were not able to take care of
themselves, an obvious and straight-
forward remedy would be to change
the accredited investor standard—to
raise the requirement to an annual
income of $500,000, for example. 
The SEC does not propose doing 
this but rather seeks to bring all
hedge fund advisers under the
umbrella of SEC regulation, no matter
what type of investors they may
have. This approach is a significant
departure from our current policy 
of not expending taxpayer funds to
protect wealthy and sophisticated
investors. 
The SEC’s rationales for pushing such
a significant departure are, first, that
hedge funds are prone to having a
fraud problem, and, second, that
there is a growing “retailization” of
hedge funds. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the SEC does not present
much evidence to suggest that fraud
in hedge funds is much of a problem.
Yes, fraud does occur in hedge funds,
but the losses pale in significance
compared to, for example, investor
losses incurred because of the recent
“late-trading” scandals in mutual
funds—an industry, by the way, that
the SEC already intensively regulates.
And the investors harmed in the
mutual fund scandals were not the
“qualified” investors typical of hedge
funds but the low-to-moderate
income investors who probably do
need regulatory protection. The
implication is hard to miss: we might
be wiser to devote more taxpayer
resources to protecting mutual fund
investors than to protecting hedge
fund investors. 
Further, there are private mechanisms
that hedge fund investors can use 
to protect themselves. They can 
custodialize assets, for example, as
12 Center on Japanese Economy and Business Program on Alternative Investments
Why should far less wealthy taxpayers have to support government regulation
aimed at protecting wealthy investors?
—Franklin Edwards
do mutual funds, and demand that
hedge fund managers be monitored
by prime brokers, who would be
responsible for the valuation of the
hedge fund assets. In many ways I
think a private market examiner can
work better than a government exam-
iner in understanding and monitoring
the complex portfolio instruments
often used by hedge funds. 
Indeed, given the dangers that 
the SEC warns about, how can we
explain the $800 billion already
invested in hedge funds? And why
should hedge funds be growing so
fast if investors are susceptible to
being ripped off through fraudulent
activities? Are all of these hedge
funds investors simply naïve? Or, is it
that the risk of fraud is not as great
as the SEC would have us believe, or
that there are effective private mecha-
nisms by which investors can control
this risk? My guess is that investors
know more about this risk than does
the SEC. 
The SEC also argues that there is a
trend toward the “retailization” of
hedge funds—or that less wealthy
and sophisticated investors are gain-
ing access to hedge funds through
innovative investment vehicles. If 
this is the concern, a straightforward
response would be to raise the
“accredited” investor standard so that
less sophisticated investors would 
be excluded. But the SEC does not
propose this. Alternatively, another
approach (not discussed by the SEC)
might be to embrace the concept of
greater investor access to hedge
funds, but only under a certain insti-
tutional structure that would provide
some protection for less sophisticated
investors. 
Instead, the SEC proposes to require
the registration of virtually all hedge
fund advisers, arguing that this would
provide the necessary investor pro-
tection at little or no cost. Any hedge
fund adviser, incidentally, can already
register with the SEC any time he 
or she wishes to; and many have
already done so. Presumably, hedge
fund advisers would register if they
believed that investors wanted them
to and that it was cost effective to do
so—that the attraction to investors
would generate sufficient profits to
offset the cost of SEC regulation. For
example, institutional investors (such
as pension funds) may prefer to 
deal only with SEC-registered hedge
funds. But what does that imply
about the thousands of hedge fund
advisers who have not chosen to reg-
ister? An obvious possibility is that
there are in fact costs associated with
registration or that many hedge fund
investors do not really care whether
advisers are registered with the SEC. 
I don’t accept the idea that all or
most of the hedge fund advisers 
who have not registered are all just
scoundrels or that all of the hedge
fund investors invested with unregis-
tered advisers are just naïve about
the risks. 
In my view, the SEC’s proposal 
also fails to satisfy the required cost-
benefit calculation. The SEC seems to
start with a different paradigm from
mine, which is that if there is little or
no cost associated with regulation,
let’s regulate. I start philosophically
and ideologically at the other end of
the spectrum: if there are little or no
benefits, we should not impose regu-
lation on markets. Admittedly, under-
lying my philosophy is a view that
there are embedded costs to all regu-
lation and government interference
with private markets. As such, I want
to be sure that there are significant
and important benefits from regula-
tion. It’s a difference in philosophy,
but an important one. It requires the
SEC to make the case that there are
likely to be important benefits from
requiring hedge fund adviser registra-
tion. Otherwise, it should not be
extending regulation. In my view, 
the SEC has not met this test. 
An argument made by Commissioner
Goldschmid today that I had not really
focused on before is that wrongdoing
in mutual funds (such as the recent
scandals) would be easier for the 
SEC to police if the SEC also policed
hedge funds. This may be right. If the
SEC had been looking at hedge funds,
it might have picked up on the fact
that some hedge funds were just trad-
ing mutual funds, which would have
raised a “red flag”—how could it be
so profitable to trade in and out of
mutual funds? But to argue that we
must regulate hedge funds to protect
mutual fund investors seems like a
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stretch. If we can’t protect mutual
fund investors by regulating mutual
funds directly, we clearly have a
problem that needs to be addressed
directly. Further, where do we draw
the line: do we have to regulate all
investors in mutual funds, or just
some? And, if just some, which ones?
To go down this path takes us far
afield from whether hedge funds
need to be regulated. 
Finally, I think the right mindset with
which to approach regulating hedge
funds is that we should be trying to
make hedge fund investments more,
not less, available to investors. The
SEC appears to have the opposite
view—that the objective should be 
to further restrict the availability of
hedge funds. I believe there is evi-
dence to support the view that hedge
funds offer investors different invest-
ment strategies that can be used to
increase diversification and enhance
risk-adjusted returns. One possibility
is to permit a broader distribution 
of “funds of hedge funds” under an
institutional structure that provides
protection for smaller, less sophisti-
cated, investors. The task should be
to determine exactly what that institu-
tional structure should be. What dis-
closure regulations or risk controls
would be needed? As far as I can
determine, neither the SEC nor any-
one else is thinking along these lines,
which is unfortunate. 
While I do not agree with the SEC on
hedge fund regulation, I want to say
that I remain a big fan of the SEC.
For example, I think the SEC’s recent
proposal to increase shareholder
access to the election of corporate
directors is a good idea, and I hope 
it persists in making this happen.
Indeed, I can’t help wondering why
the SEC is using up any political cap-
ital on its proposal to regulate hedge
fund advisers when it has so many
other very important initiatives going
that promise much greater benefits. 
In conclusion, I want to again thank
Commissioner Goldschmid for his
willingness to be here today and to
engage us in discussion. 
Mason: Thanks very much for those
comments, Frank. Our next speaker
is Nobuyuki Kinoshita, a senior 
official at Japan’s Financial Services
Agency who has also served in the
Japanese Ministry of Finance. All too
often the U.S. debate over hedge
fund regulation has failed to take into
account any significant international
dimensions, and so we are particularly
fortunate to have the opportunity to
hear from a representative of another
of the world’s leading economies 
on this topic. I might add that Mr.
Kinoshita is currently a visiting fellow
at the Center on Japanese Economy
and Business. 
NOBUYUKI  KINOSHITA
Director, The Financial Services
Agency of Japan
Thank you, Dr. Mason. I am currently
a visiting fellow at Columbia University,
sent by the Japanese Government,
having a long career as a financial
regulator and lawmaker, now in the
Financial Services Agency, and for-
merly in the Ministry of Finance.
Today I will make a small contribution
based on my personal experience and
my way of thinking as a Japanese
policymaker. Please note that my
speech does not represent the views
of the Japanese Financial Services
Agency. 
Please keep in mind that the status of
the Japanese Financial Services Agency
(FSA) is different from that of the
U.S. SEC or other governmental
organizations. First of all, the FSA
covers both the securities industry
and institutional investors such as
trust banks and life insurance compa-
nies. Additionally, I suspect that
Japanese households’ confidence in
and psychological reliance on the
government may be stronger than
that of American households vis-à-vis
their government. Furthermore, the
tension between the FSA and the
financial industry in Japan may be
higher, especially with banks.
When we talk about the regulation 
of hedge funds, we should first of all
discuss what the purpose of regula-
tion is. In this context, we can con-
sider two different purposes. The 
first is the protection of individual
investors and the establishment of
trust in the capital markets, and the
other is the maintenance of financial
markets’ stability. When we consider
these two purposes, we should be
careful to avoid distortional side
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effects on financial markets as much
as possible.
Next, we should discuss how to regu-
late hedge funds and consider two
different types of measures. The first
type is direct measures, such as regu-
lations based on the Securities and
Exchange Law and the Investment
Adviser Law. The second type is indi-
rect measures, such as regulations
based on the Banking Law and the
other regulatory laws of institutional
investors. When we consider these
two types of measures, we should be
careful to maintain the consistency of
the targets with the original purposes
of the legislation.
Based upon this framework, I will
first give a brief explanation of the
Japanese situation, and then I will
make some comments regarding 
the regulation of hedge funds in the
United States. In Japan, we can find a
growing demand for investment serv-
ices like hedge funds. A considerable
percentage of institutional investors
are interested in investment in hedge
funds, including funds of hedge
funds. The amount of money invested
by hedge funds in the Japanese capi-
tal market has been increasing year
after year to several billion dollars.
Furthermore, in connection with the
industrial recovery, the importance 
of alternative investments is widely
acknowledged nowadays. We are
making efforts to gain a better under-
standing of hedge funds’ activities.
However, a large part of the invest-
ments are supposedly made through
foreign legal entities. We suspect
there are various reasons for this situ-
ation, such as differences in business
practices or the avoidance of regula-
tions, but also the structure of the
Japanese legal system, which must 
be an important factor. The target 
for us should be building the proper
infrastructure for the various types 
of investment activities. 
The first problem for policymakers
when talking about hedge funds 
is the definition. We can point out
the general characteristics of hedge
funds, such as the performance fee,
the unique investment strategy,
including high-leverage, and lack of
regulation to some extent. The “per-
formance fee” feature is connected
with managers, “investment strategy”
can be connected with funds them-
selves, and the  “regulation” feature 
is the theme of today’s symposium.
However, there is no single definition
of a hedge fund we could quote as
the definition in lawmaking.
When we take a bird’s-eye view of
the Japanese legal system, we see 
the strong civil law tradition adopted
from Continental Europe, especially
Germany. The system requires pre-
cise definitions of what is and what is
not allowed. The forms of legal entity
are fixed by legislation, such as civil
law. We also have strict discipline in
which a crime must be defined in an
article of a law. The purpose of this
discipline is the protection of people
from arbitrary actions and punish-
ments by the government. We follow
this discipline in financial regulation
laws as well, including the securities
and exchange law and the investment
adviser law, because the ultimate
basis of these regulatory laws is legal
punishment. 
I want to focus on the first purpose,
the protection of investors. In the
Securities and Exchange Law, the
concept of “securities” is defined 
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in the very first part. Then the law
prescribes all measures to protect
investors who invest in these securi-
ties and, hence, regulates the related
industry that provides services con-
cerning the transactions of securities.
The securities are defined one by one,
following the concept of basic laws,
such as civil law, trust law, company
law, and law concerning several types
of unions. Recently, we added the
law for collective investment vehicles,
which I believe will contribute to 
the development of an asset-backed
securities market in Japan. 
However, we have no legal concept
of limited partnership, so that the
transactions of equities of those part-
nerships are at the margin of the cov-
erage of the Securities and Exchange
Law. Market participants should con-
sult us, for example, by requesting a
no-action letter. 
On the other hand, we have an
established regulation system for
securities investment, including col-
lective investment vehicles. A fund
manager is regulated by special
duties for investors such as fiduciary
duty, strict obligations of accountabil-
ity, and control by the authority. In
the case of public offering, additional
regulations are enforced, such as
public disclosure and the limit of
leverage. We believe that the regula-
tion system has a positive effect for
the development of the market by
helping establish the confidence of
actual and potential investors.
As for advisers, we have the Invest-
ment Adviser Law. Those who want
to advise securities investors as pro-
fessionals register with the authorities
as securities investment advisers. A
securities investment adviser provides
cash collateral and is subject to 
special duties for investors, such as
fiduciary duty, strict obligations of
accountability, prohibition of particu-
lar actions such as loss compensation,
and supervision by the authorities.
We believe the regulation of advisers
also has a positive effect by cultivat-
ing the trust of actual and potential
investors.
Through these laws, we regulate
securities investments, including what
hedge funds are concerned with in
order to protect investors, although
we have no specific regulation for
hedge funds—partly because of the
definition problem. Managers of
hedge funds must register and obey
the regulations if the conditions of
these laws are applicable to them.
The target for us is not a single issue
such as regulation of hedge funds but
building the proper infrastructure for
various types of investment activities. 
Currently, a considerable amount of
investment activity in Japan is con-
ducted from abroad through offshore
legal entities or by foreign advisers.
This phenomenon can be partly
attributed to differences in business
practices or the avoidance of regula-
tion, but we believe the Japanese
market can develop in a stronger and
sounder manner by establishing a
more flexible legal system. As the
first step, we have already introduced
the Limited Liability Investment
Union as an additional investment
vehicle in which equities can be
treated as securities as defined by 
the Securities and Exchange Law.
Furthermore, we are now discussing
the introduction of a comprehensive
legal system to protect investors and
hence to establish confidence in the
investment services industry. 
Next, I will focus my speech on the
second purpose, the maintenance of
financial markets’ stability. Hedge
funds are frequently referred to as a
source of systemic vulnerability or
market dislocation, because of their
high leverage and huge amount of
investment. On the other hand, I
know many who argue that hedge
funds provide liquidity to the markets. 
In this connection, we have the regu-
lation of banks and other institutional
investors such as insurance compa-
nies. The purposes of these regula-
tions are the protection of depositors
or insurance policyholders through
the sound and proper management
of these institutions. The stability of
financial markets can be achieved as
an extension of the original purpose
of the regulation. 
In Japan, we have an established reg-
ulation system based on the Banking
Law. We have risk management
supervision, capital adequacy ratio,
limits on exposure, and limits on
stock holdings. We also have strong
supervisory measures such as the
improvement order and inspection
and systematic regulations for other
institutional investors such as insur-
ance companies.
As for implementation, we have
established an off-site monitoring sys-
tem for financial institutions based on
a computer system, in addition to our
inspection activity. We watch the risk
position of an institution as a whole 
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continuously through our system. The
target for us is not an individual or
specific exposure, but we monitor
risk concentration as well. We collect
risk-related data from every financial
institution, make up a database of all
financial institutions, analyze the data
using our own software, and give
feedback on the data to each finan-
cial institution. We have a special task
force for the computer system of off-
site monitoring, consisting of finan-
cial, engineering, and information
technology experts. We have periodic
consultations with management direc-
tors of financial institutions based on
this information, as well as financial
reports and results of on-site inspec-
tion of financial institutions. 
These regulations might have the
effect of restraining excessive expo-
sure of financial institutions’ invest-
ments, including those in hedge
funds, although we have no specific
regulation for investment in hedge
funds. As for possible future amend-
ments, I am personally not so eager
to introduce new regulations focused
solely on financial institutions’ invest-
ments in hedge funds. It might have
the side effect of causing a distortion
in the capital markets, and it would
be technically difficult. Of course, the
proprietary trading of financial institu-
tions should be carefully monitored.
The purpose of the monitoring
should not be the restraint of specific
exposure such as that to hedge funds
but the maintenance of the sound
risk position of an institution as a
whole. Anyway, this issue is not lim-
ited to hedge funds but also related
to all high-leveraged investments.
This issue has been discussed on
international stages, such as the 
Basel committee.
Next allow me to give my personal
comments on the regulation of hedge
funds in the United States, based on
my personal experience as a policy-
maker. When we consider a new 
regulation, we consider the purpose
of the regulation. In the case of the
regulation of hedge funds, it partly
depends on whether investors are
sophisticated enough not to need
protection.
As for measures to regulate hedge
funds, we should weigh and maintain
a balance between the effectiveness
and the burden of the regulation. The
objects, the contents, and the tempo
of introduction of the regulation are
important balancing measures. The
factors to be considered for maintain-
ing the balance depend on the situa-
tion of concerned market participants.
In the case of the regulation of hedge
funds, the balance is supposed to be
quite delicate. If the result is exces-
sively strong, the investment services
currently provided through hedge
funds would shrink or go abroad. If
it is too weak, or if the government
would not have enough resources 
to enforce the regulation, the new
regulation arising from the registra-
tion system would be abused by
unscrupulous firms as being a certifi-
cation from the government. 
According to my personal experience,
the overall reliance on government 
is still high, especially among retail
households in Japan. Regulation in
Japan appears to give a false impres-
sion of governmental approval to
whatever is being regulated. Therefore,
I think that we should be careful to
avoid abusing the use of regulations
by making a halfway one. Once we
decide to regulate, the regulation
should be effective in law and imple-
mentation. 
However, it depends on the signifi-
cance of related factors that might be
totally different in the United States. 
I imagine that the U.S. SEC and other
institutions struck a balance between
costs and benefits of the regulation
after a careful examination of various
factors in this country.
As a conclusion to my presentation, 
I would like to mention possible
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international impacts of the U.S. 
regulation of hedge funds. Investment
activities through hedge funds are
widespread in the international capi-
tal markets, not only the markets of
industrialized countries like Japan,
but also smaller and developing mar-
kets. If the United States introduces
regulation of hedge funds, measures
by which the U.S. maintains a bal-
ance between the effectiveness and
burden of the regulation, this will
have an important influence on inter-
national markets.
Therefore, the discussion regarding
hedge funds in the United States
should also reflect the consideration
of the impact on the operation of
small and developing economies. At
the same time, consistency between
the regulations in industrialized 
countries is even more important.
Otherwise, regulatory “shopping”
would occur, and a distortion would
be caused by the capital flow outside
the country. We have had international
discussions on similar kinds of issues
at international conferences supported
by several organizations such as 
the International Organization of
Securities Commissions.
Thank you very much for your atten-
tion.
Discussion
Goldschmid: I have two quick com-
ments, first on Mr. Kinoshita’s presen-
tation, and then on John Gaine’s
remarks. International issues related
to hedge funds are very important
and complex. You’ll see in the SEC
adopting release on hedge funds a
very sophisticated set of provisions
dealing with international funds.
Some of the oversight that we’d
apply to the U.S. funds will not be
applied for international funds. We’re
very careful and work hard to make
sure we don’t cross lines or create
special problems for funds in other
countries.
John, I didn’t mean to suggest that
the corrupting influence of hedge
funds exempts or somehow makes
easier or better the reaction of the
mutual fund managers. We’ve been
very hard on mutual funds—and their
wrongdoing managers—in terms of
disgorgements, bars, and civil penal-
ties. Those who were corrupted, or
assisted the corruption that occurred,
had to suffer. To make deterrence
and accountability work, we’ve had
to be hard. 
You hear in John’s comments a kind
of decency and constructiveness. His
group has indicated it will work with
the SEC on a sensible regulatory
scheme in terms of monitoring. That’s
just the kind of constructive attitude
and insight that will make this system
as effective as we want it to be. 
Frank Edwards is obviously an old
and highly respected friend—even
when we differ. And he’s right on
about at least two of the three things
he mentioned in terms of shareholder
access to the proxy and mutual fund
governance. On hedge funds—yes—
it was another one of those areas that
would create controversy, and we
understood that. But it was the
potential for harm if the SEC failed 
to act that I keep emphasizing. Yes,
we are trying to protect investors, but
it’s also the magnitude of harm that
could be created in a trillion dollar
plus business that keeps jumping to
mind. It’s the amount of trading that
hedge funds are doing. It’s the cor-
rupting role they played in what
went wrong in mutual funds, and it’s
the need for us to understand what’s
going on in terms of the integrity of
our markets. 
Stepping back on the sometimes-
controversial reform steps that have
been taken over the past two years,
think about the potential cost of the
public distrust that had developed 
in 2001–2002. If you go back to the
time of our greatest financial scandals
during the Great Depression, shares
on the New York Stock Exchange 
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fell from $90 billion to just under 
$16 billion, and they didn’t recover
for a very long time. The activity of
the Commission has made an enor-
mous difference in the willingness of
our public to believe in the integrity
and the fairness of U.S. markets. So
you can see, I take a certain pride in
what the SEC has accomplished.
Mason: Thank you, Harvey. Before
taking questions from the floor, I hope
you don’t mind if I leverage my posi-
tion as moderator to ask a few ques-
tions of some of the panelists myself.
Let me start with Jack. Jack, as I
understand it, not all of your mem-
bers are against the rule that was just
passed by the SEC. First of all, is that
true, and if it is—are there any dis-
cernable patterns? Is it the case, for
example, that larger hedge funds that
are members of the MFA are not so
clearly opposed to the new rule as
compared to other of your members?
What’s the situation within your own
membership?
Gaine: Our position was that one
should be free to decide whether to
register with the SEC. If you’re inter-
ested in ERISA money, a registered
investment adviser becomes, by defi-
nition, an investment manager under
ERISA, which I believe serves to
reduce certain liability, which would
make it a very attractive part of your
business model. You’d look at the
cost of SEC registration versus the
benefits, as Dr. Edwards believes, and
you’d say that there are some bene-
fits. You could increase your investor
base, and that made sense.
We have members who have made
that choice and registered. So the
issue was mandatory registration by
the SEC, and on that issue there was
a consensus. Then there was a major-
ity who felt very strongly that regis-
tration did not make sense at all.
While I can’t give you a survey, we’re
not against voluntary registration.
Goldschmid: The reason hedge funds
are so successful, having gone from
$100 billion to $1 trillion, in relatively
few years, is because the model 
does make sense, at least for certain
investors. It’s not the model that’s the
problem and it’s not the model we’re
regulating; nothing the SEC has done
in its rule-making will interfere with
short selling or arbitrage or anything
else. The SEC does, however, need
limited oversight to deter fraud and
understand larger problems that
could be developing.
Gaine: Your numbers could be right. 
I know that some of the largest hedge
funds are in fact registered, but it comes
back really to the role of government.
I think it was Mark Anson, the chief
investment officer for CALPers, who
said he invested in 17 hedge funds.
Nine are advised by registered invest-
ment advisers; eight are not. 
Audience Questions and
Answers
Question: Mr. Kinoshita, in many
ways, if I understand it correctly,
your registration is close to what
we’ve proposed. Until now we’ve
said in effect that hedge funds are
special and we would not have regis-
tration, but what we’re doing I sus-
pect will put us in the same place.
Kinoshita: Yes, it is true. We have
the suitability rule in our securities
exchange control but not such a spe-
cific regulation. I suppose we do not
find any reasons to regard investment
in hedge funds as extraordinarily
risky beyond the self-responsibility
principle.
Mason: I would like to ask Sudhir 
a question. Presumably, one of the
ways that a reputable fund of funds
such as Rock Creek adds value is to
conduct detailed, in-depth due dili-
gence of specific hedge funds that
you might invest in. Is it fair to say
that this new measure would in no
way create information or provide you
with information that you wouldn’t
have found out on your own?
November 17, 2004 Should Hedge Funds Be Regulated? 19
We’re not against voluntary
registration.
—John Gaine
Krishnamurthi: Would it put us out
of business? The answer is perhaps
“no.” I think John said it right; we do
a lot more due diligence than perhaps
any SEC audit could ever hope to
accomplish. We have many more
resources, and our investors expect
that of us. 
There are two things that, as a fund
of funds, we don’t have. One is that
we cannot call unannounced. We
have to announce ourselves before
we go. The SEC has the option of
doing an audit on very short notice.
The second is that the only deter-
rence we have is the ability to pull
out money. We cannot criminally
prosecute. I think those are the two
areas where I think the SEC definitely
has a little bit more clout, and it can
prosecute criminally and make it a 
lot more difficult for the hedge fund
managers. And that does create the
deterrence and the accountability in
terms of making the system work-
able, although notice there’s some
cost saving in this, too. The more
due diligence you do, the better, so
far as I’m concerned, and certainly
we’re not going to interfere. We
encourage it to no end.
Patrick: On that point, I’m not a
detective or a cop or even have a
good nose for it, but Elliot Spitzer
and Chairman Greenspan have said
that we do not discover fraud on
audit. I think if you can’t prosecute,
you can be a tipster. If you find fraud
you can go to the SEC. That hedge
fund that you were looking at is 
subject to the antifraud rule of the
Advisors Act. The SEC can issue a
formal order of investigation. Staff
members can be in there tomorrow
and follow up on whatever tip you
give them because that is the think-
ing among that group. I know
Commissioner Goldschmid disagrees.
I don’t know; the view there among
these people is that a tip, a disgrun-
tled employee, or a disgruntled 
significant other or spouse or some-
thing is how you get these things
uncovered, not through routine
examinations.
Goldschmid: It’s obviously a mix of 
a whole bunch of things that creates
effective inspection and enforcement
systems. That’s why I indicated that
five of the eight cases that the SEC
brought against registered advisers
came about because of Commission
inspections. They came about
because of OCIE (the SEC’s Office 
of Compliance, Inspections, and
Examinations), and the number of
times that occurs is real for broker
dealers, for mutual funds, for others.
Eliot Spitzer, of course, doesn’t really
have the capacity to do a large num-
ber of inspections. But inspections
are an important part of the whole
mix. They go with tips. They go with
whistle-blowers. I have the world’s
greatest respect for Alan Greenspan,
but he doesn’t put 15 auditors into
numerous banks because he thinks
they can’t discover things. I incorpo-
rate by reference my prior discussion
of why SEC inspections have power-
ful deterrent effects.
Question: I manage a small Japanese
equity hedge fund in New York. I
started my hedge fund one year ago,
after working at a Wall Street invest-
ment bank for 25 years. I went to a
reputable law office last week for a
seminar on compliance with respect
to everything we have been discussing.
There are an incredible number of 
regulatory requirements, and what
you’re advocating in these regulations
will mean an enormous amount of
compliance` costs and legal fees to
an entity like mine. I’m almost debat-
ing whether I should continue on,
because I honestly want to be fully
compliant with every regulation there
is, but the cost of start-up is enor-
mous. This would be a great business
for lawyers, but for an entity like
mine, it is absolutely devastating. 
Do you categorize the degree of
compliance requirements depending
on the size of entities? 
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Goldschmid: It’s an important state-
ment, but be careful of the lawyers, 
if I can put it bluntly. There’s nothing
that you’re being asked to do that’s
terribly onerous. We know that
roughly 40 percent of investment
advisers to hedge funds are currently
registered, and there are thousands of
small investment advisers out there
who are regulated under present law.
They’re paying an average of roughly
$45,000 to be able to comply. There
is some danger that lawyers are
going to make this seem more oner-
ous than it really is, so you want to
be careful in terms of the advice you
are getting. 
Realistically analyzed, there is nothing
in this regulation that should put a
small investment adviser for a hedge
fund out of business or create an
entry barrier that is significant. Come
down and ask the SEC staff how to
do it. 
Question: I just have to say some-
thing in defense of the New York
lawyers. Having represented probably
close to a hundred hedge funds, 
I would say we have equal numbers
of registered and unregistered funds.
I think the start-up hedge funds, as
you point out, don’t have to register
until $25 million, but it’s the funds
between $25 million and $100 million
that aren’t making enough from their
basic investment management fee to
cover the start-up cost of compliance.
Once they know what they’re doing,
perhaps the ongoing cost is not 
as significant. But I think what was 
really underestimated was how 
much time, effort, and education 
it is costing.
So you’re starting a great business,
but not for the lawyers. To be per-
fectly honest, lawyers don’t want to
get into the nitty-gritty of how every-
one keeps their e-mails. We advise
on these kinds of things, but there’s a
whole business springing up now of
compliance people, outside people
who will advise on compliance, but
the initial cost of making the code of
ethics, making the compliance manu-
als, getting someone within a small
adviser who is going to be the com-
pliance officer and take the responsi-
bility is very big for that fund that’s 
in the $25- to 100- million range. 
My question is: “Why the rush to
pass it so quickly?” Our firm looked
at the actual draft, and we saw so
many ambiguities in it. 
Goldschmid: In terms of why we
moved ahead, acting was consistent
with sound public policy. We had
done this over a period of several
years. There was a report, then a
proposal, and then comments were
taken. In the final release, I think,
you’ll find a fair amount of guidance.
The SEC has a continuing program
that works with the financial and
business communities to clear up
ambiguities. We publish answers to
questions that are commonly asked.
We give “no action” letters in areas
where there’s been some ambiguity.
In terms of a compliance date, it’s
February 2006. So there’s a long lead
time in terms of what’s being done.
There’s plenty of room for questions,
no action letters, reactions, more
guidance, if needed.
I am concerned about small advisers.
But I suspect by the time small advisers
really have to comply, there will be
computer programs and other things.
It’s not all that complex; its not all
that difficult; there ought to be rela-
tively easy forms for people to follow
and computer programs to use.
Question: I teach at Rutgers University.
Quite frankly, I find myself very 
troubled by a lot of what I’ve heard
today. First of all, and I don’t mean
this to be personal, but the record of
the SEC with regard to mutual fund
behavior certainly doesn’t comfort me
with regard to what it might find with
regard to hedge funds.
Secondly, I think there is a point 
in life where individual investors
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acquire enough assets that they are
assumed to be capable of taking
responsibility for their actions. If that
size is not appropriate at the present
time, then it ought to be raised.
Thirdly, I’m troubled by the fact that
all this might do is push the business
offshore. It seems to me that unless
there is some international agreement
to provide some type of compliance
or regulated requirements, all that’s
going to happen is that the business
is going to leave the country, and the
result is that you really will have
accomplished nothing except to come
down hard on the people who are
new in this business, and I have a
certain amount of sympathy for them. 
But I do think that the underlying
issue that really troubles me is the
idea that people have to be protected
from themselves, and if they’re in
unsophisticated institutions or pen-
sion funds, then there ought to be
regulations applied to them across
the board and not with regard only
to hedge funds, because they could
just as easily lose their shirts investing
in real estate, salad oil, or anything
else.
Goldschmid: Caveat emptor—buyer
beware. You take it at your risk. This
was often the thinking roughly a
hundred years ago. We just don’t
think that way today. Sophisticated
buyers may well need disclosure 
and protection from fraud. In terms
of hedge funds, even if one were
willing to use caveat emptor in its
strongest form, it wouldn’t prevent
me from being concerned about the
macro impact of hedge funds on the
nation’s economy, about the amount
of trading hedge funds are doing,
about their leverage and risk, etc. 
As for hedge funds going offshore, 
I think that’s just illusory, unreal. 
The issues raised here as to the small
investment advisers and entry barriers
are worth thinking about again. 
For big funds, the SEC’s regulatory
scheme is nononerous. You’d have to
be irrational, or a fraudster, to put it
bluntly, to want to go offshore because
of what we’re imposing. It’s much
too mild. 
Gaine: I want to make one short
comment on that. The SEC, Division
of Investment Management, did a
50th-anniversary study of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 and pub-
lished it in 1992 or 1993. Included in
there was a recommendation that
Congress should adopt what eventu-
ally became Section 3(c)(7) of the
1940 Act, which is the provision that
Frank Edwards alluded to, that for an
individual with $5 million in invest-
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ments then, you didn’t need “protec-
tions of the federal securities laws.” 
I can see it in the upper right-hand
corner of your report, which is about
700 pages. 
So Congress, as recently as 1996, has
recognized this, that maybe there are
better ways to do it, but that wealth,
income, net worth, etc. serve as 
some proxy for something. Maybe it’s
because you can take the hit, maybe
you know something, maybe you can
afford to hire somebody, but it has
been recognized, and I think we
should be somewhat responsive as 
to what Congress wants.
If I could just finish on one quick
story. Larry Summers, when he was
secretary of the treasury, is in the
middle of giving a speech. So some
guy in the back stands up and says,
“If you’re so smart, why aren’t you
rich?” and Summers said, “Well, if
you’re so rich, why aren’t you smart?”
I think there’s something to that, and
whether this is the best proxy or not
I don’t know, but it’s the only one
we’ve had. We’ve worked with it for
years.
Mason: Frank, one of the things I
thought was very helpful in your
paper was that you took a long-term
perspective on the past development
of the financial services industry and
government regulation. I wonder if
you have any thoughts looking for-
ward? Is it your instinct that this is
the first of many measures that will
be imposed on the hedge fund indus-
try, or do you feel that we’ve seen
the end of it with this rule?
Edwards: All of my experience with
regulation suggests that the registra-
tion of advisers will certainly not be
the end of it. I think Harvey said it as
well as I could say it. Once you have
regulation, it is natural for regulators
to tinker with it and try to make it
better. And that usually means more
regulation, not less.
Goldschmid: I’ll make one final
remark. Jack Gaine and I really are in
the same place. I don’t think regula-
tion ought to go further in this area. 
I think this model works for hedge
funds. I don’t want to regulate deriva-
tives, and I don’t want to regulate
other things. I don’t think the SEC is
going to do it, although I suspect I’ll
be back at Columbia before anyone
thinks about it again. The idea of
being able to tinker and straighten
things out can be deregulatory as
well as regulatory.
If you want to think about a deregu-
latory world in the context of the
present Commission, we are now
looking at the 1933 Act concerning
new issues. What we’ve proposed
will heavily deregulate and prevent a
lot of wheel-spinning, waste, and
interference with speech and other
things that have been out there. 
The trick to government is not always
to regulate further. As Jack said, in
terms of hedge funds, we’ve come to
the water’s edge, and that’s as far as 
I want to go.
Mason: We’ve now come to the end
of our symposium. Please join me in
thanking our speakers for sharing
their time and wisdom with us this
afternoon.
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